

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:				NO.	
				DATE	
TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1.			2 FB.		1 to 3: Ref. par 1, A, [] inform me that no action has been taken as yet, and SS would like to have our comments.
2.					
3.			18 FEB		Par. 1, B - [] had no comment to make as he is not familiar with the SS party.
4.					Par. 1, C - Noted by [] he had nothing to say.
5.					Par. 1, D - Noted by []
6.					Par. 1, E - 9 gave [] copies of my letter to []
7.					Par. 2, A - Noted by []
8.					Par. 2, B1 - [] state that [] was ready to fly the mission for us but at last minute we informed him that we would act independently. [] agrees the difficulty arose because of poor liaison in the field.
9.					Par. 2, B, 2 and 3; and 2C 9 did not raise, nor did 9 mention par. 3.
10.					
11.		DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3 B 2 B			Par. 4 - [] agreed that there had obviously been a slip-up in liaison.
12.	NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT	DATE 2007			Par. 5 - Noted by []
13.					
14.					
15.					

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

29 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: []

I am attaching a paper designed to show the points of disagreement presently existing between OPC and SIS in respect to FIEND/VALUABLE activities. I believe it may be helpful in your talk with []

[] []

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SECURITY INFORMATION

1. National Committee for a Free Albania

A. Method of Maintaining Control.

The British are apparently altering the existing method of maintaining control by switching []

[] unilateral action reported by [] in January 22nd states that [] nationalized this change on the basis that [] is unable to effectively carry out his duties while in Rome [] has advised that he would also like to see [] but was proceeding with [] irrespective of our plans for [] and also has asked the Foreign Office to concur to his proposal to advise the Italians that [] is in Rome as an unofficial observer with the Committee. [] advised that [] is writing a letter on this matter but in any event the British are proceeding without prior consultation. On January 9th [] reported by dispatch that SIS was investigating the possibility of working openly with the Italians on a service level as they are thoroughly familiar with our activities in Italy in respect to Albania. Actually, SIS has already taken such a step as [] reported on January 13th that the Italian Service had been informed of the activities of [] and his predecessor []

B. Composition of NCFA.

The British continue to hold the position that the inclusion of certain BKI leaders in the Committee on any basis is undesirable. However, they have professed an open mind on the matter and a review of the OSO charity operations is being transmitted to the British to convince them of the strength of these individuals still command. In the past the British have resisted efforts to broaden the Committee as evidenced by their attitude toward Ali Klissura. Their present thinking (1-D) does not suggest a change is imminent.

C. Attitude Toward NCFA, Its Role and Function as a Refugee Organization.

[] summary dispatch of December 27th emphasizes that the British have persistently refused to agree to developing the NCFA as OPC feels it should be developed. Rather than encouraging and directing the various sub-committees to prosecute studies and complete programs designed to provide answers to the myriad problems involved in reestablishing a free Albanian Government, the British have been content to treat the NCFA simply as a meaningless facade for FIEND/VALUABLE operations. On the other hand, as [] pointed

out by

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SECURITY INFORMATION

out by cable on January 23rd, the British appear to be promoting the opposite course of action within the European Union. This organization, made up of exiled leaders from various Eastern European countries including Albania, recently held a four day meeting in London with the two-fold objective of preparing constructive political and economic policies for countries behind the Iron Curtain for use when these countries are freed and of keeping hope for eventual liberation alive within these countries.

D. Favoritism Towards Balli Kombetar.

Rather than adopting and pursuing an impartial attitude toward all the parties represented within NCFA, evidence points to the fact that the British are favoring the Balli Kombetar. [] has reported that British financial support is responsible for the Balli Kombetar newspaper and news bulletin which compare favorably with NCFA publications. Balli Kombetar party leaders have recently adopted an arrogant attitude, openly stating to members of other Albanian political parties, they are under no obligation to the Americans and can repay their dollars at any time. Furthermore British opposition to reorganization of the Committee works to the advantage of the Balli Kombetar who have flatly refused further consideration of broadening for fear of losing strength in NCFA if a reorganization were effected.

E. Seat of NCFA Headquarters.

The difference of opinion existing over the location of NCFA headquarters did not come into the open until the Independence Day celebration of November 28th 1951. At that time British congratulatory messages were sent to Rome rather than to New York on the grounds that the British always regarded Rome as NCFA headquarters. This viewpoint is in direct opposition to the agreement reached when NCFA was established in 1949. Our position on this question was clearly outlined in a letter to [] in January 1952.

2. 1952 Operations

A. Agent Operations

Despite general agreement at the October Rome meeting on agent operations for 1952, recent cables from London indicate the British are presently planning 1952 agent operations on a more modest scale than originally scheduled. The most recent information in our hands indicates six intelligence infiltration missions are planned. In addition two coup de main operations may be added to the schedule. [] report that the Malta training area is being

closed, the

closed, the offer of 3 W/T trainees and Zef Pali's recent statement that [redacted] advised him agent operations were to be deemphasized in 1952, tend to confirm the British are scaling down 1952 agent operations.

B. Psychological Warfare Operations.

1. Leaflet Raids.

In January when Valuable was scheduled to fly a leaflet raid, FIEND took over the operation as [redacted] was unable to carry out his end of the agreement which calls for leaflet drops at six to eight week intervals with the two services alternating on the matter of providing aircraft for the drops. Although [redacted] switched his position and agreed to furnish a plane (not accepted because of the time factor) he passed along the comment that he believed FIEND was pressing too hard in Albania and reported Valuable had altered its schedule and was only planning two or three leaflet raids during 1952.

2. Radio

No particular comment has been received on the programs of the clandestine transmitter but the British have frequently expressed the viewpoint that VOA and RFE give undue attention to the BKI on their broadcasts thereby implying U.S. backing of this particular party. It is not felt this criticism is valid and appears unwarranted in face of reported partiality to the Balli Kombetar on BBC broadcasts.

3. Propaganda Supply Drops

British opposition to these drops was manifested in a recent cable expressing the view that our method of aerial delivery was questionable and our program of dropping flour bags put us in a vulnerable position as the packages were excellent targets for contamination by the Communists. [redacted] reported these acid observations may very likely merely reflect wounded pride as the British are apparently running into difficulties perfecting the release of their delay device for this drop mechanism and plan three or four such raids during 1952.

C. Economic Warfare

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Recent Naval Intelligence reports provided us with information that the British Freighter Marietta is currently engaged in East-East Trade and recently carried a varied general cargo including vehicles from Russia to Albania. It was brought to [] attention this vessel offered a tempting sabotage target and a vehicle for the introduction of propaganda material into Albania. SIS did not rise to this hint but [] reported the Captain was fully briefed on Valuable and had been asked to furnish SIS with certain intelligence reports.

3. Miscellaneous

Attitude Toward Yugoslavs

BGFIEND has adopted and maintained the policy that NCFA should not establish liaison with the Yugoslav sponsored Albanian Committee and should only make contact if approached. Furthermore, it was agreed that action toward using or cooperating with this Committee must be preceded by a presentation to the Yugoslav Government of the joint US/UK stand relating to Albania's independence. Although nothing definite is known the British may be proceeding on a unilateral basis and may have established contact with the Yugoslav sponsored Committee.

4. []

[] as recently indicated to [] he is dissatisfied with liaison in Athens and has called [] to London for consultation. [] believes the only basis for this is in [] mind and reports [] as been neglected and left to shift for himself during the past six weeks.

5. Security

During his recent extended London visit, Zef Pali had two meetings with [] From Pali's statements it is apparent that the discussion of plans for agent and psychological warfare operations may represent a breach of security. Considering past experience and the decisions reached at the Rome meeting in respect to cutting NCFA members in on operations, OPC has asked for further details of these conversations.